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Original Article
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been paid to the 
relationship between contentious politics and democratiza-
tion. Writing against a transitology literature that portrays 
mass mobilization as exogenous to successful democratiza-
tion (e.g., O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986), political sociolo-
gists and social movement scholars (Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Tilly 2003a) have argued that 
popular pressure from below is a key factor in bringing about 
democratic breakthroughs and sustaining political liberaliza-
tion.1 A parallel literature on civil resistance claims that mass 
mobilization is more likely to result in democratization if 
protestors adopt nonviolent methods (Celestino and Gleditsch 
2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2012). While transitologists 
and civil resistance scholars insist that all collective violence 
is orthogonal to democratization, previous analysis has not 
adequately accounted for variation in its qualities. This 
lacuna is puzzling. Instances of unarmed collective violence 
by civilians—including rioting, hand-to-hand fighting with 
security forces, and the destruction of property—are com-
mon to episodes of mass uprising. This paper asks: What is 
the significance of such acts for the prospects of 
democratization?
We develop our analysis in four steps. After reviewing 
the extant literature on democratization and civil resis-
tance, we propose the category of unarmed collective vio-
lence as an empirically recurring but heretofore 
understudied form of contentious collective action. We 
then turn to assessing its impact on democratization by 
quantitatively analyzing cross-national, time-series data 
on contentious events in 103 nondemocracies from 1990 
to 2004. A competing risk analysis allows us to compare 
the effects of unarmed collective violence on the odds of 
subsequent liberalization and deliberalization. Our results 
suggest that riots and property destruction, two common 
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Abstract
The literature on civil resistance finds that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to succeed than violent insurgencies. 
A parallel literature on democratization poses mass mobilization as exogenous to political liberalization. Contributing 
to both literatures, we propose the category of unarmed collective violence to capture an empirically recurring form 
of unruly collective action used by civilians and then use a mixed methods research design to examine its impact on 
democratization. An event history analysis finds that riots are positively associated with political liberalization in 103 
nondemocracies from 1990 to 2004. Attacks by civilians on police stations during the January 25 Egyptian Revolution 
illustrate one way in which unarmed collective violence can bring about a democratic breakthrough. A qualitative 
examination of all 80 democratic transitions held between 1980 and 2010 also reveals the salience of unarmed collective 
violence by civilian forces. These findings contribute to research on the dynamics of contentious democratization and 
suggest that remaining unarmed may be more consequential for a democracy campaign than adhering to nonviolence.
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1By political liberalization, we do not mean a successful transition to 
a consolidated liberal democracy, but instead an improvement in the 
situation of political rights and competition that might fall short of 
a full democratic transition. We return to this point in later sections.
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categories of unarmed collective violence, are positively 
associated with political liberalization. We find no signifi-
cant effect for riots on deliberalization. Thus, the claim 
that violence undermines democratization does not hold 
when we account for whether that violence is unarmed. 
We are also interested in specifying the underlying mech-
anisms by which unarmed collective violence can impact 
processes of democratization. A focused examination of 
attacks on police stations during the Egyptian Revolution 
of 2011 illustrates one way in which unarmed collective 
violence can positively contribute to political liberaliza-
tion. As the Egyptian case reveals, unarmed collective 
violence by local residents protected peaceful protestors 
by disrupting the Mubarak regime’s repressive apparatus 
while also diverting repressive forces away from frontline 
protest policing duties. As a further empirical check, we 
then undertake a qualitative examination of incidents of 
unarmed collective violence during all 82 democratic 
transitions held between 1980 and 2010. Our analysis 
reveals the salience of riots, hand-to-hand fighting, and 
property destruction to the transitional process, suggest-
ing that instances of unarmed collective violence are not 
sufficient to derail democratization.
These findings lend support to the contentious democrati-
zation literature, which finds that low-level disruption aris-
ing from unauthorized and unruly collective action can 
enhance the prospects for democratization (Kadivar and 
Caren 2016; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Wood 2000). That 
unarmed collective violence can be productive of democrati-
zation holds out a key implication for the civil resistance lit-
erature: Some portion of the positive effect of nonviolent 
tactics on democratization campaigns may in fact be attribut-
able to episodes of unarmed collective violence. That this has 
hitherto gone unacknowledged is in part an artifact of the 
civil resistance literature operationalizing violence to mean 
armed insurgency.2
Armed Insurgency, Nonviolence, and 
Democratization
Transitologists stress the role of political elites during epi-
sodes of democratic transition (O’Donnell and Schmitter 
1986; Przeworski 1991). Viewed from this perspective, 
democratization is a game played between four main actors: 
hardliners and softliners in regimes and moderates and radi-
cals in the political opposition. For democratic transitions to 
succeed, it is argued, members of the moderate opposition 
must make a pact with regime softliners: Regime hardliners 
and political radicals are portrayed as potential spoilers, who 
must be marginalized or bought off.3 Such studies argue that 
popular mobilization in any mode increases the perceived 
costs of the transition for hardliners, incentivizing them to 
scotch any attempt to diminish their powers and preroga-
tives. Needless to say, episodes of collective violence are 
portrayed as particularly ruinous of any attempt to transition 
away from authoritarian rule. As Samuel Huntington (1993) 
insisted in his classic study of the third wave of democratiza-
tion, collective violence cannot be productive of democrati-
zation because it enhances the position of a regime’s coercive 
apparatus. Reflecting on the occurrence of violence during 
third wave democratization, Huntington surmised that: 
“Governments created by moderation and compromise 
[were] ruled by moderation and compromise. Governments 
produced by violence [were] ruled by violence” (p. 207).
While the transitology literature is skeptical of popular 
pressure from below in any form, more recent scholarship 
on nonviolence and civil resistance makes a distinction 
between the impact of violent and nonviolent action on 
democratization campaigns. Drawing on a data set of vio-
lent and nonviolent secessionist, anti-occupation, and anti-
regime campaigns in the twentieth century (NAVCO), Erica 
Chenoweth and Marie Stephan (2012) find that nonviolent 
campaigns are more likely to succeed than campaigns 
employing violent insurgency. According to that study, non-
violent campaigns have lower moral, informational, and 
material costs for participation and thus are more likely to 
mobilize a greater number of participants and elicit greater 
public sympathy. In consequence, it is argued, nonviolent 
collective action in the name of democracy is more likely to 
encourage regime defection, increase the cost of repression, 
and induce international sanctions against the regime. This 
is contrasted with the dynamics of violent insurgency, which 
exact a high cost on any potential recruit, serve to justify 
repression, alienate international support, and reduce the 
incentives for regime defection. In a follow-up multivariate 
analysis, Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) find a significant 
positive relationship between nonviolent campaigns and 
subsequent democratization, while violence has no discern-
ible effect. A subsequent cross-national analysis does not 
find significant evidence that violence occurring coeval to 
civil resistance either positively or negatively enhances the 
prospects of a nonviolent campaign succeeding, and a quali-
tative analysis points to mixed results for selected cases 
(Chenoweth and Schock 2015).
2This claim in particular relates to the NAVCO data set, which is now 
widely used to research the dynamics and consequences of nonvio-
lent campaigns.
3Writing in the early 2000s, William Carothers (2002) would pro-
nounce the death of the “transition paradigm” owing to the small 
number of democratic transitions that actually resulted in successful 
democratic consolidation (see also Dale 2006; Gans-Morse 2004). 
The transitology literature has, however, received somewhat of a 
revival following the color revolutions of Eastern Europe and the 
Arab Spring, with cases of negotiated democratization that were “nei-
ther violent nor revolutionary” (Diamond et al. 2014:87).
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Complicating these conclusions is the definition of vio-
lence. In their qualitative analysis, Chenoweth and Stephan 
(2012:3) adopt a very broad definition of violence, which 
includes “bombings, shootings, kidnappings, physical sabotage 
such as destruction of infrastructure, and other types of physi-
cal harm of people and property.” To take one example: In their 
case study of the First Palestinian Intifada, Chenoweth and 
Stephan identify acts of stone throwing by Palestinian youths 
as collective violence—tactics that were, the authors argue, 
deleterious to the Palestinian struggle for national liberation.4 
However, when operationalizing violence versus nonviolence 
in their quantitative analysis, violence is defined more nar-
rowly as armed insurgency. This is not a coincidence. The cod-
ing of violence used in NAVCO derives primarily from the 
Correlates of War data set (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012), 
which requires that all combatants be armed and for there to be 
at least one thousand battle deaths during the course of a cam-
paign (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). This definition excises 
incidents of unarmed collective violence, which are otherwise 
coded as episodes of nonviolent protest.
Unarmed Collective Violence
We argue in this paper that unarmed collective violence by 
civilians constitutes an empirically recurring form of conten-
tious collective action that is distinct from both armed insur-
gency and nonviolent protest. Following Charles Tilly 
(2003b), we propose defining unarmed collective violence as 
episodes of social interaction that immediately inflict physi-
cal damage on persons and/or objects (“damage” includes 
forcible seizure of persons or objects over restraint or resis-
tance) without the use of firearms or explosives, involve at 
least two unarmed civilian perpetrators of damage, and result 
at least in part from coordination among unarmed civilians 
who perform the damaging acts.
Acts of unarmed collective violence by civilians, we 
posit, are not only conceptually distinct from violent acts 
undertaken by armed insurgents and instances of nonviolent 
protest, but they may also have a positive influence in under-
mining authoritarian regimes and thus set the stage for 
democratization. This is consistent with classic comparative 
historical studies on the effects of riots and democratic revo-
lutions. As Piven and Cloward (1979) argue in their study, it 
is only through the adoption of disruptive tactics that the 
politically and economically disenfranchised gain conces-
sions from societal elites. Empirical research has found that 
urban riots play an important role in the expansion of federal 
welfare programs (Isaac and Kelly 1981; see also Betz 1974). 
Similarly, scholarship operating in the mode of comparative 
historical sociology finds that violence is a key motor for 
democratization. As Barrington Moore (1966:506) argues in 
his seminal study of democracy formation in Britain, France, 
and the United States: “In the Western democratic countries 
revolutionary violence (and other forms as well) were part of 
the whole historical process that made possible subsequent 
peaceful change.” So too, Charles Tilly (2003a) argues that 
episodes of collective violence and transgressive contention 
shattered trust networks and categorical inequalities in early 
modern Europe, paving the way of democratization.
In her comparative study of third wave democratization, 
Nancy Bermeo (1997) also found that tactics such as rioting, 
destruction of property, and violently occupying factories did 
not abort democratic transitions. In fact, when moderates had 
a strong presence in the opposition, violent tactics tended to 
reinforce the negotiating position of democratic forces and 
compelled regime incumbents to make concessions. 
Similarly, Elisabeth Wood (2000), in her paired comparison 
of democratization in El Salvador and South Africa, found 
that the use of violent and unruly tactics threatened the inter-
ests of economic elites, thus making a peaceful democratic 
transition more attractive for regime hardliners. Coming 
from a different analytical tradition, Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2005) find that most democratic transitions played out 
against a backdrop of rambunctious street politics and the 
threat of violent revolutionary takeover. Likewise, Bueno De 
Mesquita and Smith (2010) argue that under certain condi-
tions, authoritarian leaders may respond to revolutionary 
threats such as antigovernment demonstrations, strikes, and 
also riots by introducing political liberalization. Finally, Aidt 
and Leon (2016) show that drought-induced riots in Sub-
Saharan Africa make democratization more likely.
Given the frequency of their occurrence, we hypothesize 
that episodes of unarmed collective violence, in contrast to 
claims by transitologists and scholars of nonviolence, do not 
derail processes of democratic transition and that their dis-
ruptive qualities may even enhance the prospects for democ-
ratization. This hypothesis brings with it three observed 
implications. First, civilians rather than members of armed 
insurgent groups are more likely to engage in acts of unarmed 
collective violence. Second, episodes of unarmed collective 
violence are often defensive measures against police repres-
sion of civilian-led, street-level mobilization. Third, unarmed 
collective violence does not credibly threaten a regime’s 
monopoly over the apparatus of force. In these encounters, 
civilian demonstrators rely on rocks, Molotov cocktails, 
sticks, and other improvised weapons.5 For these reasons, we 
expect that the effects of unarmed collective violence vary 
significantly from those of armed insurgency (see also Case 
forthcoming). Here we adduce three possible effects: First, 
unarmed collective violence disrupts civic order and so raises 
4See here a useful article by Jeremy Pressman (2017), who anticipates 
our argument in his characterization of stone throwing by Palestinian 
youths as acts of “unarmed violence.”
5Molotov cocktails are improvised incendiary weapons typically used 
by civilians and so fall within our definition of unarmed violence.
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the costs of ruling for an incumbent regime. Second, images 
of unarmed civilians battling with the forces of order can 
galvanize others to protest, particularly in the wake of repres-
sion. Finally, episodes of unarmed collective violence can 
exhaust the repressive capacity of a regime and divert its 
coercive agents away from frontline protest policing duties, 
thus creating opportunities for protest elsewhere. We now 
explore these hypotheses as they relate to the dynamics of 
political liberalization and democratic transitions.
Mixed Methods Research Design
In what follows, we focus on the relationship between 
unarmed collective violence and democratization, which we 
define as progress toward more representation and political 
rights that guarantee the peaceful transfer of executive power 
through elections. By this definition, a polity can be democra-
tizing without meeting the minimums of an electoral democ-
racy; that achievement is marked by the onset of a democratic 
transition. This follows the literature on hybrid regimes and 
democratization, which studies improvements in political 
practice that fall short of an electoral democratic regime (e.g., 
Aidt and Leon 2016; Howard and Roessler 2006).
In the first section, we present the results of a regression 
analysis accounting for the effects of different unarmed pro-
test tactics on political liberalization and deliberalization. 
This allows us to detect a general association between differ-
ent forms of unarmed protest and political liberalization 
across time and space. To more properly understand the 
causal effects of unarmed violence on democratization, we 
complement the quantitative analysis with a detailed case 
study of unarmed collective violence in Egypt during the 18 
days of the January 25 Revolution to identify potential mech-
anisms connecting unarmed collective violence with a demo-
cratic breakthrough. We then offer a qualitative analysis of 
episodes of unarmed collective violence during democratic 
transitions away from authoritarian rule. Taking the broadest 
possible universe of cases, we focus on all “third wave” dem-
ocratic transitions that occurred between 1980 and 2010.
Unarmed Collective Violence and 
Political Liberalization
To investigate the general effect of unarmed collective vio-
lence on political liberalization, the most superficial form of 
democratization, we draw on a daily count of protest events 
reported in the World Handbook of Political Indicators IV 
(WHIV; Jenkins et al. 2012). WHIV is a refined version of 
contentious events from King and Lowe’s (2003) “10 Million 
Dyadic Events,” which are computer-coded events taken 
from the Reuters newsfeed. This data set has been used by 
social scientists to study various phenomena, such as the 
influence of human rights INGOs (Murdie and Davis 2012), 
neo-liberal policy reform (Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn 2009), 
and anti-government protest in democracies (Su 2015). WHIV 
is an improvement on the original data in several ways. Most 
importantly, the number of events has been reduced by around 
14 percent, after events previously coded as contentious were 
identified to be noncontentious. The WHIV data have been 
checked internally against a basecode and externally against 
other event data sets.6 An additional advantage of the WHIV 
data is the ability to temporally locate events in the protest 
month and so take into account lagged effects with more pre-
cision than annual data such as NAVCO. The WHIV covers 
1990 to 2004, and so we confine attention to this period.
Kadivar and Caren (2016) first used the WHIV data to 
test for the effect of protest activities on political liberaliza-
tion. Their analysis finds that contentious collective action, 
broadly defined, increases the chance of liberalization in a 
given month (measured as a 1 point change in a country’s 
Polity IV score) and has no effect on the odds of deliberal-
ization. That study, however, does not account for variega-
tion in the qualities of contentious politics. In this paper, we 
expand on that analysis by accounting for the effects of dif-
ferent protest tactics on a more substantive operationaliza-
tion of de/liberalization. The WHIV data include six 
categories of protest: protest obstruction, protest procession, 
protest altruism, protest demonstration, protest defacement, 
and riots.7 While these categories are not based on theoreti-
cal constructs, protest defamation and riots are examples of 
unarmed collective violence, while protest obstruction, pro-
test procession, and protest altruism are nonviolent forms of 
protest. Protest demonstration was the residual coding cate-
gory for unarmed events that lacked sufficient information 
to be assigned to a more specific protest type—and so 
contains instances of nonviolent contention and unarmed 
collective violence (Jenkins et al. 2016). Of note, two previ-
ous studies have explored the impact of different forms of 
protest on democratization. Teorell (2010) finds that riots 
have no effect on democratization, while more peaceful pro-
tests are positively associated with the onset of democratiza-
tion. Ulfelder (2005) finds that riots are negatively associated 
with the breakdown of military dictatorships, while inci-
dents of peaceful protest increase the likelihood of regime 
failure in military and one-party regimes. Both of these 
studies rely on data gathered from the New York Times and 
6For more information, see http://sociology.osu.edu/worldhandbook.
7These categories are defined as follows: protest obstruction—sit-
ins and other non-military occupation protests; protest procession—
picketing and other parading protests; protest defacement—damage, 
sabotage, and the use of graffiti to desecrate property and symbols; 
protest altruism—protest demonstrations that place the source (pro-
testor) at risk for the sake of unity with the target; protest demonstra-
tions—all protest demonstrations not otherwise specified; riot—civil 
or political unrest explicitly characterized as riots as well as behavior 
presented as tumultuous or mob-like. This behavior includes looting; 
prison uprisings; crowds setting fire to property; general fighting with 
police (typically by protestors); ransacking offices, embassies, and so 
on; and football riots and stampedes.
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take the national country year as their unit of analysis with 
protest variables lagged by one year. WHIV offers two 
advantages in this regard. First, monthly interval data allow 
us to account for protest events leading to a liberalization 
event within the same year. Second, the Reuters newsfeed 
provides far greater coverage of disparately located world 
events than a print newspaper.
The dependent variable is time to liberalization and 
deliberalization. We operationalize liberalization and 
deliberalization as a positive or negative change of 3 points 
or larger in a country’s Polity IV score, respectively. This 
follows the approach used by Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 
(2010) and is used to measure a substantive change in a 
country’s democracy score. As a robustness check, we 
rerun all models with changes of 2 points or larger and also 
a more basic measure of 1 point positive and negative 
change. The unit of analysis is the national country month. 
The polity score is an aggregate measure between −10 and 
10, which is derived from five more specific indexes that 
assess the competitiveness of executive recruitment, open-
ness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief 
executive, regulation of political participation, and com-
petitiveness of political participation. Polity classifies 
regimes with a score between −10 and −6 as closed autoc-
racies; regimes with a score between −5 and −1 are 
designated as open autocracies; regimes with a score 
between 1 and 5 are closed democracies; and regimes with 
a score between 6 and 10 are identified as open democra-
cies. In our analysis, we include closed and open autocra-
cies and closed democracies, that is, all states with a polity 
score of less than 6, since Polity IV takes this as the thresh-
old of transiting to a democratic regime. By this measure, 
there are 88 instances of liberalization and 20 instances of 
deliberalization in our universe of cases. Confining atten-
tion to nondemocracies inevitably captures fewer instances 
of deliberalization. Increasing the threshold of democratic 
transition to 8 leads to only a modest increase in incidents 
of deliberalization (27 cases in total). As a further robust-
ness test, we rerun all models with this higher threshold 
and summarize the results in the following. A series of 
control variables are introduced to account for various 
rival explanations. The source and theoretically relevant 
expectation for each variable is given in Table 1.
A simple comparison lends support for an association 
between unarmed collective violence and political liberaliza-
tion. Across 103 nondemocracies, there were on average 
more riots in the 11 months before a liberalizing event than a 
month without a liberalizing event. We see a similar pattern 
for other protest forms, with the exception of protest altruism 
(see Figure 1).
Table 1. Control Variables.
Variable Literature Data Source
Military regime Scholars argue that military regimes are more likely to break 
down compared to other authoritarian regimes (Brownlee 
2009; Geddes 1999).
New Data on Autocratic Breakdown 
and Regime Transitions(Geddes, 
Wright, and Frantz 2014)
One-party regime
Personalistic regime
Political openness Polities with higher degrees of openness might already 
have some democratic institutions and be more apt for 
liberalization. On the other hand, it is possible that such 
polities use their semi-democratic institutions to avoid further 
liberalization. This measure also partially accounts for different 
levels of repression in different nondemocratic regimes.
Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002)
Oil production (ln) Research on the resource curse suggests that oil revenues 
hinder democratization (Ramsay 2011; Ross 2012) while also 
demobilizing popular opposition (Smith 2004).
The Oil Curse (Ross 2012)
GDP per capita (ln) Scholarship on democratization finds that higher levels of 
economic development enable democratization (Boix 2011; 
Przeworski and Limongi 1997).
World Bank Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2012)
GDP growth % Adverse economic conditions can push incumbents to make 
democratic concessions. Citizens are also more likely to 
protest under economically adverse conditions (Caren, Gaby, 
and Herrold 2017)
Population size (ln)  
Formerly democratic Previous democratic experiences could have created cultural 
and material resources for protest activities as well as future 
democratization.
Polity IV
Regions Democracies are clustered regionally (Brinks and Coppedge 
2006). Also, over the time period of the analysis, there was an 
important wave of protest and democratization occurred in 
Eastern Europe that might drive the main findings.
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To account for rival explanations and possible confounding 
factors, we use Cox proportional hazards models to more prop-
erly evaluate the impact of different forms of protest on political 
liberalization (Cox 1972; Cox and Oakes 1984). As noted previ-
ously, the unit of analysis is the country month, beginning with 
a country’s last instance of liberalization or deliberalization and 
ending with either a country exiting the universe of cases due to 
a democratic transition or censoring at the end of the study 
period in December 2004. Ties—countries that experienced a 
liberalization or deliberalization after the same number of 
months—are handled using the Breslow method. The survival 
of nondemocratic regimes rates is modeled as a function of key 
independent variable(s) and a vector of potentially confounding 
covariates. Robust standard errors account for the clustering of 
multiple democratic regimes in a single country while also 
increasing statistical stringency. Regional effects are fixed in all 
models.8 Because a given political regime is at risk of both lib-
eralizing and deliberalizing, we use a competing risk model 
(Fine and Gray 1999). Here, we run the model with liberaliza-
tion (positive changes of 3 points and greater) as the failure and 
deliberalization and smaller positive changes (1 or 2) as the 
competing risk, and then vice versa. This treatment allows us to 
estimate the effects of different forms of unarmed protest on lib-
eralization and liberalization while the other outcome is also a 
potential risk (Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the 
independent variables).
Table 3 presents the results of the duration analysis with lib-
eralization as the main outcome and deliberalization as the 
competing risk. Model 1 is the baseline model with the primary 
control variables. Each subsequent model includes an indepen-
dent variable to account for different forms of unarmed protest. 
These indicators are counts of events, which are standardized 
by subtracting the mean of each variable and dividing by its 
standard deviation. We enter each tactic separately as several 
are highly correlated (r > .60) and to reflect the fact that move-
ments use different tactics at different stages of a campaign.9 
Beginning with measures of nonviolent protest, the coefficients 
for protest demonstration and picketing at time t – 1 are 
Figure 1. Monthly average protest in 11 months prior to liberalization and deliberalization.
8Note that we include a dummy variable for the following regions for 
each given country: Sub-Saharan Africa (n = 43), Middle East (n = 
19), Eastern Europe (n = 13), East and South East Asia (n = 12), Latin 
America and the Caribbean (n = 10), Central Asia (n = 7), South Asia 
(n = 4), and Oceania (n = 3).
9An alternative approach is to group tactics by their abstract quali-
ties—as instances of either unarmed violence or nonviolent pro-
test. This requires excluding protest demonstration as this category 
contains both nonviolent and unarmed violent tactics. Entered indi-
vidually, unarmed collective violence is substantively significantly 
associated with substantive political liberalization (p < .01), while 
nonviolent protest is positively associated with liberalization, but this 
falls just outside the bounds of accepted statistical significance (p = 
.13). Reassuringly, unarmed collective violence is also negatively 
associated with deliberalization—although this does not approach 
statistical significance (p = .44). Note that both grouped variables 
remain highly correlated (r = .66), and so we model each separately 
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statistically significant and positively associated with political 
liberalization at time t, while the coefficients for sit-ins and pro-
test altruism are not statistically significant. Our two measures 
for unarmed collective violence are positively associated with 
political liberalization: The coefficients for riots and protest 
defacement are statistically significant and associated with an 
increase in the odds of political liberalization at time t. Taken 
together, these results suggest that net of all other factors, epi-
sodes of unarmed collective violence protest enhance the pros-
pects for democratization.
Turning to our control variables, the level of political 
openness has a negative effect on the odds of liberalization, 
indicating that regimes that have already introduced some 
measures of liberalization are less likely to experience fur-
ther liberalization.
The results in Table 3 are provocative. We have found a 
positive association between different kinds of unarmed col-
lective violence and political liberalization. One objection 
may be that these forms of contentious events might induce 
mixed effects on democratization. Indeed, recent studies of 
political liberalization and deliberalization in authoritarian 
regimes argue that those factors that push countries toward 
liberalization can also pull them toward deliberalization 
(Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2015).10 This is addressed in 
Table 4, which presents the results of a duration analysis for 
the time to experience a deliberalization outcome. Model 1 is 
the baseline model with the main control variables.11 Similar 
to Table 3, the indicator for political openness is statistically 
significant and shows a positive association with the chance 
of deliberalization, suggesting that regimes with more open 
political processes are more likely to see retrenchment and 
backsliding. The coefficient for military regimes is statisti-
cally significant, but the coefficient is close to zero. Models 
2 to 7 introduce our protest variables, none of which approach 
statistical significance. In other words, there is no evidence 
to conclude that episodes of either unarmed collective vio-
lence or nonviolent protest at time t – 1 leads to political 
deliberalization at time t.
A digression on robustness is germane. A well-known 
shortcoming of the Polity IV data set is that it does not 
assign a score to countries undergoing a transition or during 
an interregnum. A second problem relates to the coding of 
the Polity score itself: two subcomponents of the Polity rat-
ing—PARCOMP (competitiveness of participation) and 
PARREG (regulation of political participation)—measure 
the level of conflict within a polity. This may lead to an 
endogeneity problem in which our protest variables are cor-
related with our dependent variable. We can address both 
Table 2. Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Median p5 p95 sd sd_w sd_b
Picketing 0 −.367 −.367 1.577 1 .780 .648
Protest altruism 0 −.288 −.288 2.091 1 .803 .608
Protest demonstratio 0 −.384 −.384 1.340 1 .733 .759
Sit-ins/occupation 0 −.332 −.332 1.149 1 .794 .868
Protest defacement 0 −.282 −.282 1.856 1 .852 .543
Riot 0 −.266 −.266 .982 1 .826 .624
Prior liberalization .085 0 0 1 .279 .267 .098
Prior deliberalizati .034 0 0 0 .181 .169 .126
Military regime .065 0 0 1 .247 .144 .203
One-party regime .330 0 0 1 .470 .140 .441
Personalistic regime .277 0 0 1 .447 .163 .400
Political openness −3.290 −4 −10 5 4.677 2.376 4.221
Oil production (ln) 2.6190 .856 0 8.243 3.030 .5819 2.786
GDP growth % 1.436 1.89 −10.2 10.8 8.430 7.604 5.722
GDP per capita (ln) 6.622 6.383 4.990 9.341 1.297 .1767 1.262
Population size (ln) 15.897 15.978 13.214 18.139 1.4987 .096 1.496
Formerly democratic .2457 0 0 1 .430 .0438 .455
Note: p5 = bottom 5 percentile; p95 = top 5 percentile; sd = standard deviation; sd_w = standard deviation within; sd_b =  standard deviation between.
as collinearity results in upwardly biased standard errors. When both 
unarmed collective violence and nonviolence are modeled together 
to predict liberalization, both signs remain positive—but unarmed 
collective violence does not achieve statistical significance (p = .24).
10Note that our empirical approach departs from Tilly’s work on democ-
ratization. Tilly (2003a) states that if mechanisms of democratization are 
reversed, de-democratization would be the outcome. We do not make 
such an assumption in our empirical analysis—and as our findings 
show, while unarmed violence may be a potential mechanism of democ-
ratization, its occurrence does not correlate with de-democratization.
11Due to a low level of variation in military regimes, it is not possible 
to obtain a numerically stable estimate of the association between 
military regimes and the risk of deliberalization; thus, this indica-
tor is excluded from the model. Note that including this variable 
does not alter the coefficients of interest, the signs for which remain 
unchanged and not statistically significant.
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issues by dropping all cases undergoing transitions and 
interregnums and strip the potentially correlated subcom-
ponents from our polity scores. We can also operationalize 
de/liberalization as changes of 1 or 2 points or greater in a 
country’s Polity IV score instead of 3 points and introduce 
additional controls for a regime’s repressive capacity (mili-
tary personnel and expenditure per capita) and the age of an 
authoritarian regime. Further, we can also expand the sam-
ple size to include countries with polity scores of less than 
8 to see if our results are sensitive to changes in criteria of 
inclusion into our sample. We also estimated simple logit 
and multinomial logit regression instead of a Cox model to 
ensure that our results are not sensitive to assumptions 
made in the Cox model regarding duration. Rerunning the 
analysis with those alternative specifications, our results 
remain substantively unchanged.12
Another potential limitation of our analysis is the issue of 
endogeneity in general. It is possible that an omitted variable 
is responsible for both the incidence of rioting and political 
liberalization. Note here that our control variables account 
for a number of plausible alternative explanations for politi-
cal liberalization, such as a country’s level of economic 
development, economic growth, the level of openness in the 
Table 3. Competing Risk Survival Analysis for Protest and Liberalization.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Riot 1.082*
 (.0348)
Protest defacement 1.134**  
 (.0475)  
Sit-ins/occupation 1.014  
 (.0716)  
Protest demonstration 1.186***  
 (.0498)  
Protest altruism 1.156  
 (.105)  
Picketing 1.153*  
 (.0733)  
Military regime .809 .850 .822 .923 .814 .905 .867
 (.424) (.440) (.426) (.499) (.428) (.481) (.456)
One-party regime .570 .588 .566 .690 .571 .635 .610
 (.222) (.235) (.219) (.285) (.224) (.258) (.243)
Personalistic regime .552 .548 .551 .612 .554 .592 .577
 (.201) (.201) (.201) (.231) (.203) (.220) (.213)
Political openness .895*** .891*** .890*** .895*** .895*** .896*** .896***
 (.0239) (.0247) (.0243) (.0249) (.0243) (.0241) (.0241)
Oil production (ln) .943 .939 .940 .936 .943 .938 .938
 (.0520) (.0532) (.0510) (.0533) (.0520) (.0523) (.0521)
GDP per capita (ln) 1.147 1.124 1.136 1.098 1.144 1.141 1.142
 (.192) (.193) (.184) (.192) (.193) (.193) (.191)
GDP growth % .412 .486 .384 .494 .423 .433 .496
 (.427) (.509) (.382) (.517) (.441) (.437) (.511)
Population size (ln) 1.186 1.148 1.170 1.089 1.182 1.141 1.154
 (.125) (.130) (.125) (.123) (.130) (.124) (.123)
Formerly democratic 1.221 1.230 1.210 1.320 1.217 1.298 1.285
 (.354) (.347) (.352) (.380) (.356) (.375) (.379)
Failures 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Competing 121 121 121 121 121 121 121
Censored 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
Subjects 278 278 278 278 278 278 278
Clusters 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
Observations 13,060 13,060 13,060 13,060 13,060 13,060 13,060
Akaike Information Criterion 915.8 915.4 916.6 910.2 917.8 914.7 916.0
Note: Exponentiated coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
12The outputs are available from the authors on request.
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polity, and oil production. Still, we are cognizant that an 
instrumental variable would be desirable to completely rule 
out omitted variable bias. This is an important future chal-
lenge for the nascent literature on cross-national studies of 
contentious politics, which has thus far failed to identify an 
appropriate instrument to study the phenomenon. We pro-
ceed here on the basis that the impact of unarmed collective 
violence on democratization is an important topic for politi-
cal sociology and political science and welcome a revisiting 
of our results if and when an instrument or another effective 
strategy to address the issue of endogeneity is identified. To 
buttress our quantitative findings, we now go on to explore a 
qualitative case study of anti-police violence during the 
January 25 Revolution in an attempt to identify potential 
mechanisms linking unarmed collective violence with a case 
of political liberalization.
Unarmed Collective Violence in Egypt
In this section, we spotlight the case of Egypt during the 18 
days of the January 25 Revolution in an attempt to illuminate 
the disruptive effects of unarmed violence during a recent 
liberalization campaign. Here, the Egyptian case deepens our 
understanding of the quantitative findings and the qualitative 
comparison (in the following section) by illustrating one 
ideal-typical pathway through which unarmed collective vio-
lence can enhance other kinds of nonviolent mobilization 
and thus bring about a transition away from authoritarian 
Table 4. Competing Risk Survival Analysis for Protest and Deiberalization.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Riot .517
 (.425)
Protest defacement 1.105  
 (.137)  
Sit-ins/occupation 1.001  
 (.206)  
Protest demonstration 1.103  
 (.146)  
Protest altruism 1.569  
 (.489)  
Picketing 1.123  
 (.252)  
One-party regime .742 .727 .635 .712 .742 .693 .790
 (1.165) (1.138) (.880) (1.091) (1.168) (1.099) (1.273)
Personalistic regime 2.515 2.528 2.948 2.552 2.516 2.588 2.401
 (1.607) (1.647) (2.063) (1.646) (1.646) (1.657) (1.498)
Political openness 1.532*** 1.532*** 1.552*** 1.533*** 1.532*** 1.534*** 1.526***
 (.0974) (.0970) (.114) (.0960) (.0973) (.0962) (.0998)
Oil production (ln) 1.482 1.475 1.377 1.483 1.482 1.479 1.496
 (.374) (.375) (.348) (.372) (.378) (.373) (.383)
GDP per capita (ln) .389 .387 .450 .386 .389 .392 .378
 (.285) (.283) (.317) (.279) (.285) (.283) (.287)
GDP growth % .0157 .0175 .0156 .0171 .0157 .0162 .0145
 (.0427) (.0483) (.0382) (.0473) (.0431) (.0434) (.0393)
Population size (ln) .584 .577 .634 .576 .584 .579 .613
 (.217) (.214) (.219) (.210) (.215) (.209) (.253)
Formerly democratic 1.285 1.197 1.315 1.239 1.284 1.248 1.356
 (.964) (.939) (.993) (.914) (1.018) (.904) (.980)
Failures 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Competing 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
Censored 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
Subjects 278 278 278 278 278 278 278
Clusters 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
Observations 13,060 13,060 13,060 13,060 13,060 13,060 13,060
Akaike Information Criterion 196.2 198.0 193.5 198.1 198.2 198.0 196.9
Note: Exponentiated coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
10 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 
rule. A close examination of the Egyptian case reveals that 
episodes of unarmed violence by civilians can protect peace-
ful protestors by diverting a state’s repressive forces away 
from frontline protest policing duties while disrupting the 
coercive capacity of an authoritarian regime and so help 
bring about political liberalization. The year after the January 
25 Revolution saw the lifting of the emergency law, ousting 
of a dictator of 30 years, decline in the repression of protest, 
emergence of an energetic and independent media space, and 
holding of five competitive national elections (including the 
first free parliamentary and presidential elections since the 
founding of the modern Egyptian Republic). We understand 
these steps as unambiguous indicators of a tentative liberal-
ization process, which was aborted in July 2013 by a military 
coup that quickly reversed any democratic gains made in the 
post-Mubarak transition.
Egypt’s democratic breakthrough began on January 25, 
2011, when several thousand protestors evaded police forces 
and staged a brief protest in Midan al-Tahrir, a public square 
in downtown Cairo (El-Ghobashy 2011; Gunning and Baron 
2014). This act of defiance sparked 18 days of unruly pro-
tests in public squares and main roads across the country 
calling for the downfall of Husni Mubarak. After Mubarak 
stepped down on February 11, scholars working in the civil 
resistance tradition were quick to hold up the Egyptian case 
as exemplary of the logics of nonviolent collective action in 
bringing about a democratic breakthrough (e.g., Lawson 
2015; Nepstad 2013; Ritter 2015; Zunes 2011). However, 
this designation has proven to be premature. Initial scholarly 
accounts of the protests, following international news cover-
age, overwhelmingly focused on the occupation of Midan 
al-Tahrir, where a cross-section of Egyptian society employed 
a variety of performances to communicate their commitment 
to “silmiyya” (peaceful) protest.13 However, occurring coeval 
to these heartwarming scenes of “people power” was a wave 
of unarmed collective violence that targeted the Egyptian 
Interior Ministry’s security forces and in particular, district 
police stations and state security offices (see El-Ghobashy 
2011; Ismail 2013).
In a recent empirical study, Ketchley (2017) found that 
between a quarter to a third of the country’s police stations 
were burned down, with most attacks occurring in urban dis-
tricts in Greater Cairo and Alexandria during the critical 
early days of the mobilization. Episodes of anti-police vio-
lence typically involved local residents using improvised 
weapons such as Molotov cocktails and concluded with the 
burning and looting of a police station (see Ismail 2013). 
Attacks were most likely in the home districts of slain protes-
tors, suggesting that state repression activated local kinship 
networks (Ketchley 2017). This conformed to an established 
pattern of state repression and popular retaliation in Egypt in 
which local residents exact revenge on police forces in 
response to state violence (for that history, see El-Ghobashy 
2011; Ismail 2006, 2013).
Crucially, these acts of unarmed collective violence were 
pivotal to undermining the ability of Mubarak’s national 
security state to repress peaceful protestors. As leaked police 
radio transcripts from January 28 vividly capture, police 
forces on the ground, faced with roving columns of protes-
tors and crowds of local residents attacking their bases of 
operation, were ordered to withdraw from the streets and 
regroup at police stations, leaving anti-Mubarak protestors 
free to mobilize.14 Police absence from streets let protestors 
to set occupations in public squares and streets. In the days 
following January 28, senior Egyptian police and Interior 
Ministry officials reported that officers in urban areas were 
refusing to turn up for duty for fear of further attacks, includ-
ing in districts where the police station remained intact.15 
The damage to police morale was so great that a politician 
described Egyptian police as “a broken army. More or less 
like the Egyptian army after the defeat of 1967” (Ashour 
2012:9). State security offices, police checkpoints, police 
vehicles, courts, offices belonging to Mubarak’s ruling party, 
and prisons were also attacked and set on fire during this 
period. Still, in governorates where the police were not 
attacked, Interior Ministry–controlled security forces 
remained on the streets and continued to repress protests in 
the days after January 28, provoking further cycles of repres-
sion and retaliation. As a result of these episodes of anti-
police violence, the number of protestor deaths and the 
proportion of protest events that were repressed fell dramati-
cally while the number of protestors taking to the streets 
increased over successive Fridays, no doubt emboldened by 
the bottom-up defeat that local residents had inflicted on the 
Interior Ministry (see Ketchley 2017).
While attacks on police stations during the January 25 
Revolution received very little coverage in international 
news media, one episode of unarmed collective violence did 
capture the world’s attention. On February 2, 2011, pro-
Mubarak thugs and plainclothes security agents launched an 
assault on the anti-Mubarak protest occupation, leading to 
bitter scenes of hand-to-hand fighting. In what was the last 
serious attempt by the Mubarak regime to oust the protestors, 
anti-regime protestors and pro-Mubarak forces exchanged 
stones and Molotov cocktails in a protracted street battle that 
lasted into the following day (Fathi 2012). While the scale of 
this incident was smaller than attacks on police station in 
terms of protestor deaths, it was nonetheless profoundly 
significant for the course of the uprising. As the focal point 
13On the background of protestors, see Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 
(2015).
14See “Ali-Masry al-Youm Tansharu Tafasil ‘Ittisalat Shurta [Al-Mas-
ry al-Youm Publishes Details of Police Communications during the 
Friday of Anger in Alexandria],” al-Masry al-Youm, March 15, 2011.
15“Masdar Amni: Zubat Al-Shurta Kha’ifun min Al-Ahali [Security 
Source: Police Officers Are Scared of Local Residents],” al-
Shorouk, February 2, 2011.
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of the mobilization and a site of great symbolic significance 
(Said 2015), losing Tahrir would have considerably under-
mined the morale and the momentum of the campaign to oust 
Mubarak.
What lessons can be drawn from the Egyptian case? First, 
during a mass participation democratization campaign, epi-
sodes of unarmed violence can easily fall beneath the thresh-
old of scholarly visibility, leading civil resistance scholars to 
overstate the singular efficacy of nonviolent collective 
action. As our comparative analysis of unarmed collective 
violence during recent democratic transitions suggests in the 
following, such underreporting is not isolated to the Egyptian 
case. Second, unarmed collective violence can enable, facili-
tate, and impel other kinds of street-level mobilization. With 
the Interior Ministry in full retreat, the Mubarak regime was 
forced to call on local bosses and thugs to harass civilian 
protestors. This ultimately spared those protesting in Tahrir 
from greater repression and provoked further outrage and 
resentment against the regime. The Egyptian military, faced 
with a growing number of unruly protests, the collapse of 
law and order, and fraternization between army officers and 
protestors (Ketchley 2014), abandoned Mubarak, triggering 
his resignation on February 11, 2011. This paved the way for 
a parlous and highly flawed democratic transition that nev-
ertheless saw five energetic and competitive national elec-
tions and unfolded under the direction of a military-led 
transitional government. The post-Mubarak transition failed 
two years later after a military coup ousted Islamist president 
Muhammad Mursi.
Unarmed Collective Violence in 
Democratic Transitions
We now turn our attention to the impact of unarmed collec-
tive violence on democratic transitions in an attempt to 
establish how common unarmed violence has been in other 
cases. Transitions away from authoritarian rule constitute the 
most substantive kind of political liberalization as a country 
passes the threshold for a minimal democratic regime. 
Focusing on democratic transitions also allows for a system-
atic, qualitative investigation of an important subset of politi-
cal liberalization. Here, we extend the period of analysis 
from 1980 to 2010 and so cover all cases of democratic tran-
sition from the third wave of democratization.
Our measure of democratic transition is derived from a 
country’s Polity IV score, which designates a country as 
undergoing democratic transition when its score exceeds 6. 
Scholars of democratization often use this measure in studies 
of democratic transitions (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; 
Haggard and Kaufman 2012). Following this measure, 82 
democratic transitions occurred between 1980 and 2010. For 
each transition, we examined secondary sources to identify 
episodes of popular mobilization. We began by consulting 
Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo’s (2012) qualitative data set, 
which lists all Polity IV transitions between 1980 and 2000 
and identifies cases involving popular mobilization related to 
distributive conflict. We then coded the secondary literature 
on transitions that occurred between 2000 and 2010. This 
way, we were able to narrow our cases to democratic transi-
tions that resulted from contentious collective action. Next, 
we searched through protest news in LexisNexis and identi-
fied any reports of collective violence in each transition. 
Scrutinizing the original news reporting allows us to address 
one of the limitations of the data used in the regression analy-
sis. For the WHIV data, we do not have access to the text of 
the news sources—and so for this section, we read the whole 
text of the news story, not just the title or the first line, to 
identify acts of violence. Note that we do not count the mere 
occurrence of violence during transition period as evidence 
for violent mobilization leading to transition. For example, 
there were food riots during Brazil’s democratization period, 
but these riots were incidental to the mobilization against the 
country’s military dictatorship. Thus, we code Brazil as an 
instance of unarmed mobilization without significant ele-
ments of collective violence. We only include acts of unarmed 
collective violence if these acts occur as part of the mobiliza-
tion of the pro-democracy movement against the authoritar-
ian regime.
It should also be noted the purpose of this part of the anal-
yses is descriptive. We do not make a causal claim about 
whether unarmed collective violence independently influ-
enced democratic transition in all of the cases that it occurred. 
Instead, we investigate whether acts of unarmed violence 
occurred only on the margins of anti-authoritarian move-
ments or were an integral part of the mobilization that 
demanded end of authoritarian rule and led to democratic 
transition. Note that these instances of unarmed collective 
violence featured as elements in broader mobilizations 
against autocracy.
Of the 82 transitions that occurred between 1980 and 2010, 
27 did not involve episodes of contentious collective action, 
while 51 saw significant instances of popular mobilization. 
Of these, 8 involved episodes of armed insurgency, 38 had 
unarmed campaigns, and 5 transitions involved both. Among 
43 transitions that saw unarmed contention, 30 (37 percent of 
all transitions and 57 percent of all contentious transitions) 
involved instances of unarmed collective violence, while only 
14 (17 percent of all transitions and 25 percent of all conten-
tious transitions) saw no significant eruptions of violence (see 
Table A1 in the online appendix for the full list). Viewed 
against this backdrop, it is clear that episodes of unarmed col-
lective violence have figured in a significant number of 
unarmed campaigns for democratization (see Figure 2).
Table A2 in the online appendix provides a description of 
unarmed collective violence in all 30 transitions (out of 82 
transitions) that saw instances of unarmed collective vio-
lence, along with references to the source material. What is 
especially striking is the frequency of unarmed violent acts 
by pro-democracy movements, even in supposedly classic 
cases of nonviolent democratization. For instance, scholars 
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of nonviolent revolution frequently characterize the mobili-
zation against the military junta in Chile as nonviolent 
(Nepstad 2011). However, an examination of that case 
reveals numerous unarmed but nonetheless violent alterca-
tions between protestors and Pinochet’s security forces. 
Indeed, during several important episodes of street-level 
mobilization, newspaper accounts record Chilean demon-
strators as throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails at police.16
We see a similar dynamic in Madagascar, where pro-
democracy protests ended the autocratic rule of President 
Didier Ratsiraka. That case has been held up as exemplary of 
the logics of nonviolent civil resistance (Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2012). However, an alternative reading of 
Madagascar’s democratic breakthrough finds that Ratsiraka’s 
resignation was preceded by a series of riots and violent 
clashes between unarmed protestors and the police.17 So too, 
the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, which is often 
reduced to a binary opposition movement encompassing 
both armed insurgency and nonviolent civil resistance 
(Schock 2005; Zunes 1999), was involved in episodes of 
rioting, hand-to-hand fighting with the police, and property 
destruction.18
In Eastern Europe, Poland and Serbia are similarly held 
up as exemplars of how nonviolent activism paved the way 
for democratization. It is the case that in Poland the Solidarity 
movement was overwhelmingly nonviolent in the period 
prior to the Communist government’s announcement of mar-
tial law and crackdown on the movement. However, in the 
subsequent period, Solidarity protestors frequently clashed 
with security forces, throwing stones and attacking police 
vehicles. Indeed, Solidarity’s clandestine bulletins celebrated 
and publicized these episodes of anti-police violence.19 In 
1988, when Solidarity openly resumed its protest activities, 
demonstrators again clashed with security forces, throwing 
stones and using other improvised weapons as well as throw-
ing tear gas canisters back at security forces.20 We see a simi-
lar dynamic in Serbia in the period preceding the fraudulent 
election of 2000 that led to the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic. 
Opposition to Milosevic had intensified in the years prior to 
his overthrow, with protestors frequently resorting to throw-
ing rocks and bottles at the police and Milosevic’s support-
ers. These tactics escalated in the months before the 2000 
election, when violent clashes broke out between anti-regime 
opposition and the police, centering on the state’s seizure of 
an independent television station. During that episode, pro-
testors threw rocks and Molotov cocktails at security forces.21 
This set the stage for mass protests in October 2000, when 
stone-throwing protestors occupied the Serbian parliament 
and set fire to the state television station.22
The cases of Indonesia and Pakistan present two further 
examples of how unarmed collective violence occurs dur-
ing democratic transitions. In Indonesia, the post-Suharto 
Figure 2. Democratic transition types.
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democratic transition in 1999 unfolded against the back-
drop of one of the largest waves of unarmed collective vio-
lence in our sample. In response to rising food prices and 
inflation, riots took place in cities across the archipelago, 
with crowds looting shops and destroying property. 
Meanwhile, anti-regime student protestors violently 
clashed with Suharto’s security forces, throwing rocks and 
Molotov cocktails as well as setting fire to vehicles after 
police forces opened fire on protestors.23 These tactics 
continued in the post-Suharto transition, when student pro-
testors mobilized against both the Golkar party and the 
military’s continued influence in Indonesian politics.24 
Likewise in Pakistan, the country’s lawyer-led, pro-democ-
racy movement, who took to the streets in opposition to the 
military government of General Parviz Musharraf, fre-
quently scuffled with police in response to episodes of 
repression. During those episodes, suited lawyers are 
recorded as throwing stones and beating individual police 
officers with tree branches after security forces tried to dis-
perse protestors with force.25
Of course, the scale of unarmed collective violence var-
ies markedly across these transitions. In some cases, vio-
lent clashes broke out coeval to larger, peaceful protests, 
while in other cases, instances of unarmed collective vio-
lence such as rioting constituted the primary form of oppo-
sition to an authoritarian regime. One common theme, 
however, is that civilian protestors often commit acts of 
unarmed violence while themselves under attack from 
security forces or in retaliation for repression by regime 
agents, as illustrated in the Egyptian case study detailed 
earlier. An alternative trajectory saw riots break out in 
response to economic immiseration. In these instances, 
unarmed collective violence was not the primary mode of 
opposition to autocracy but was instead one of several 
kinds of contention that occurred coeval to more peaceful 
methods of contentious mobilization. Nevertheless, the 
formativeness of such episodes for the fate of democratic 
transitions should not be overlooked. By violently disrupt-
ing social, political, and economic life, unarmed civilians 
were able to sustain popular pressure from below and enact 
reprisals for state repression.
Conclusion
What is the impact of unarmed collective violence on 
democratization? We have argued that episodes of unarmed 
collective violence have played a hitherto underappreciated 
role in recent processes of democratization. We have dem-
onstrated this in three different ways. First, a survival anal-
ysis of different forms of unarmed protest shows a positive 
and significant effect for episodes of riot, a common form 
of unarmed collective violence, on the odds of subsequent 
political liberalization. At the same time, riots had no sig-
nificant effect on the odds of subsequent deliberalization. 
This analysis has its limitations. The data used for protest 
events are based on machine-coded Reuters news articles 
and so do not specify important event characteristics, such 
as whether riots were orchestrated by anti-regime forces 
and the extent of the violence. The protest data time span is 
also limited to the years between 1990 and 2004.
To address this shortcoming, we qualitatively examined 
all cases of democratic transition from 1980 to 2010 to 
uncover incidents of unarmed collective violence. While 
democratic transitions are only a subsection of political 
liberalization, they represent one of its most important 
forms as polities pass the threshold of having achieved a 
minimal form of electoral democracy. Confining attention 
to this subset of democratization also allows for a system-
atic examination of unarmed collective violence and its 
impact on democratization. Our analysis reveals that 
instances of unarmed violence, such as hand-to-hand fight-
ing with riot police, throwing stones and Molotov cock-
tails, looting, and setting fire to police vehicles and 
government buildings, occurred in over a third of all dem-
ocratic transitions and over half of contentious transitions. 
Viewed together, episodes of unarmed collective violence 
appear to have been a near-constant feature of democratic 
transitions in the third wave of democratization. That acts 
of unarmed violence are frequently carried out by opposi-
tion forces and members of pro-democracy movements 
suggests that they were not merely incidental to democra-
tization campaigns.
Again, this analysis is not without its limitations. While 
a survey of third wave democratic transitions reveals the 
prevalence of unarmed collective violence during episodes 
of contentious democratization, these data do not provide 
sufficient information for specifying the mechanisms 
through which unarmed collective violence can push for-
ward the process of democratization. To address this short-
coming, we presented a focused case study of the Egyptian 
revolution of 2011, which led to the ousting of Egypt’s dic-
tator Husni Mubarak. Egypt is a case of popular mobiliza-
tion that led to a transition away from authoritarian rule, 
which ended in 2013 when a military coup brought about a 
full-blown retrenchment to authoritarian rule. As our case 
study details, during the 18 days of the Egyptian uprising, 
there was a massive wave of unarmed attacks on police sta-
tions in Cairo, which allowed nonviolent protest to break 
out and scale up elsewhere. Taken together, these three 
analyses suggest that the disruptive qualities of unarmed 
violence can make a positive contribution in pushing for-
ward the process of democratization without provoking the 
23Seth Mydans, “Price Rises Exact a High Cost in Java,” The New 
York Times, February 8, 1998; “One Dead as Price Riots Escalate in 
Indonesia Towns,” The Washington Post, February 14, 1998; “Fire-
Bombs, Rubber Shots Fly in Medan,” The Straits Times, April 26, 1988.
24Susan Sim, “Fresh Demonstrations Erupt in Medan,” The New 
York Times, September 26, 1999; “Students Riot against Habibie,” 
The Toronto Star, October 15, 1999.
25“Lawyers Protest Continues,” The Nation, April 23, 2007; “World - 
Pakistani Police Beat Protesters,” Morning Star, December 6, 2007.
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kind of backlash commonly observed in cases of armed 
insurgency (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012).
This finding holds out an important implication for studies 
of nonviolent resistance, social movements, and democratiza-
tion more broadly. The scholarship on nonviolent protest and 
civil resistance argues that nonviolent campaigns are superior 
and more effective than violent campaigns in achieving their 
goals. We agree that unarmed and armed campaigns have dif-
ferent dynamics and that unarmed mobilization has been a 
more common pathway for bringing about democratization. 
Nonetheless, it is misleading to conflate unarmed mobiliza-
tion with nonviolence. Episodes of unarmed protest routinely 
encompass instances of unarmed collective violence as pro-
testors clash with police, throw Molotov cocktails, or engage 
in property destruction. Viewed in this mode, unarmed collec-
tive violence is one form of action that exists on a continuum 
of unarmed contentious politics that protestors can draw on in 
their struggle against authoritarian regimes (Tilly 2003b). In 
contrast to the assertions by nonviolent resistance literature, 
such acts of violence have not been detrimental to the cause 
of democratization but may have even enhanced the chances 
of a democratizing outcome.
Our analysis also calls for the improvement of existing 
data on unarmed campaigns. The NAVCO data set in par-
ticular stands out for its groundbreaking contribution to 
cross-national studies of contentious politics—one that has 
inspired research on various aspects of unarmed contention. 
Nonetheless, this has not been without criticism. As Fabrice 
Lehoucq (2016) has argued, NAVCO in its current form 
overstates the success rate of nonviolent civil resistance 
campaigns due to systematically underreporting failed non-
violent campaigns. Here, our data highlight another area of 
improvement for that and comparable data sets: Many cam-
paigns that are coded as nonviolent include significant ele-
ments of unarmed collective violence. As our analysis 
suggests, this holds out a key implication for the future 
study of contentious democratization and civil resistance 
more generally: A strict adherence to nonviolence may be 
significantly less consequential to the outcome of a democ-
ratization campaign than whether participants take up arms.
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